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Executive Summary
Institutions of higher education (IHEs—colleges, community colleges,
and universities) have a mission to provide all students, including those
with disabilities (a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more major life activities), with opportunities for a rich,
deep, and equitable learning experience, and to provide all researchers
with access to a comprehensive and varied collection of information
resources to support their work. Several disability rights laws create
obligations for IHEs to ensure that students and researchers with
disabilities have access to resources, including texts, at a level that is
as close as reasonably possible to the level of access provided to those
without disabilities. Enforcement actions can be brought by federal
government agencies (the civil rights division of the Department of
Education, for example) or by private citizens, and the result of these
actions has typically been that IHEs are compelled to improve levels of
access, including by incorporating new technology, creating new staff
positions, and implementing new policies.
For years, disability services offices (DSOs—the office or department
at an IHE tasked with supporting the needs of users with disabilities)
and others involved in fulfilling the requirements of disability rights
laws have viewed copyright (the body of law that governs copying,
adaptation, distribution, and certain other uses of works of creative
expression) as an impediment to their work. They have been uncertain
about what is permitted, and have constrained their activities in
support of civil rights out of fear of violating copyrights. The tension
has dramatically curtailed their efficiency.
This fear is due primarily to a misunderstanding of voluntary
arrangements DSOs have with some of the biggest publishers. These
arrangements place strict constraints on DSOs’ use and reuse of
accessible texts, based on the publishers’ view of their commercial
interests, not on the law. Some publishers have also included
misleading warnings on accessible texts they provide to DSOs.
The Law and Accessible Texts: Reconciling Civil Rights and Copyrights
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In reality, even in the absence of such voluntary arrangements,
copyright law provides IHEs with broad, clear authority to create
accessible copies of in-copyright works (i.e., to “remediate” them by
converting them into a format that makes it possible for users with
disabilities to acquire the same information, have the same interactions,
and otherwise derive the same benefits as other users), to distribute
accessible texts to qualified users, and to retain and share remediated
texts in secure repositories for use in serving future qualifying requests.
The key provisions in U.S. copyright law that make this possible are
Section 121, also known as the Chafee Amendment, and Section 107,
the fair use doctrine. Section 121 is a specific but broad exception
permitting authorized entities to make copyrighted works available to
the print-disabled in accessible formats without permission from the
copyright holder. Section 107 is the general right to use copyrighted
works without permission
when a set of flexible, equitable
In reality, even in the absence of such
factors weigh in favor of
voluntary arrangements, copyright
the use. A landmark case,
law provides IHEs with broad, clear
authority to create accessible copies
Authors Guild v. HathiTrust,
of in-copyright works..., to distribute
has established that fair use
accessible texts to qualified users,
authorizes IHEs to create and
and to retain and share remediated
manage repositories of digital
texts in secure repositories for use in
texts in support of accessibility,
serving future qualifying requests.
among other legitimate uses.
Together, these two rights
enacted by Congress permit each step in a workflow that starts with
a request from a student or researcher with a disability, involves
remediation and delivery of an accessible version to the requestor,
and culminates with deposit of the remediated version in a secure
repository for appropriate future use (including future remediation) in
the service of other requestors. Along the way, copyright law provides
some guidance as to how exactly each step might be conducted, but

The Law and Accessible Texts: Reconciling Civil Rights and Copyrights

7

leaves IHEs with discretion to design their systems in consideration of
values and priorities both intrinsic and extrinsic to copyright.
In addition to copyright, IHEs working together to provide accessible
texts to qualified users should consider a range of values and priorities
as they decide whether and how to take advantage of their rights.
These include their own missions, the privacy and autonomy of those
they serve, and the plausible risks (if any) associated with increasing
access to information.

Introduction
This report is written to inform the participants in a new collaborative
project to improve how accessible texts (i.e., texts in formats that
meet the needs of users with disabilities)1 are created, managed, and
stored. It provides a concise, up-to-date summary of the two key legal
pressures that bear on the creation and sharing of accessible texts: the
civil rights laws that require creation and distribution of accessible
texts by IHEs to ensure equitable access to information, and the
copyright laws that are sometimes (as we will show) misperceived
as barriers to that effort. Concern that these legal regimes may be in
tension contributes to inefficiency in making and sharing accessible
texts. Reconciling the mandates of copyright and civil rights clears the
way for dramatic improvements in service that both vindicate civil
rights and serve the First Amendment values that animate copyright.
Indeed, reconciliation is possible because
both bodies of law serve the same core
First Amendment value: increasing access
to knowledge. The title of the world’s first
copyright law, England’s 1710 Statute of
Anne, was “An Act for the Encouragement
of Learning,” a phrase so apt that the U.S.
Congress copied it wholesale in the title

Reconciliation is
possible because
both bodies of law
serve the same core
First Amendment
value: increasing
access to knowledge.
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of its first Copyright Act in 1790. Both copyright laws reflect two
assumptions: that granting authors a limited monopoly over certain
uses of their works would give them the incentives needed to create
new works; and that while copyright would impose some short-term
limits on access, the increase in available works would more than
compensate overall. From its earliest days, however, copyright law
also has included limitations and exceptions to ensure immediate
access in cases where exclusive rights overburden the ultimate goal of
promoting learning. We will show below that the general fair use right
and the specific exceptions and rules favoring access for the disabled in
current copyright law provide amply for IHEs’ creation and sharing of
accessible texts.
An important precursor to this report is the white paper Libraries: Take
AIM! (LTA),2 which describes (among other things) the challenges
to accessibility posed by copyright concerns in the DSO community,
as well as some of the shortcomings of existing efforts led by big
publishers to provide accessible texts to IHEs. LTA correctly suggests
that recent developments in copyright law give IHEs reason to rethink
copyright and take a more optimistic view of its effects on accessibility.
Our report picks up where LTA left off and explains the relevant
developments in greater detail.
Another important antecedent to this report is a two-day meeting of
experts convened in January 2019 to reexamine these legal issues and
develop a sensible consensus about how copyright law (together with
a few related concerns) would affect an accessible text-management
workflow that included federated repositories, from patron request
to remediation to multi-institutional sharing. That discussion was
striking both for its richness and for the robust consensus it achieved.
This report benefits tremendously from those conversations, but it is
ultimately the product of its authors and should not be attributed to
attendees at the meeting. Additional details about the meeting can be
found in the Acknowledgments section.
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The report begins with a brief description of the current state of civil
rights laws favoring accessibility, including trends in enforcement in
recent years. Section II provides an account of why and how copyright
concerns have served as stumbling blocks for disability service
offices (DSOs). Section III walks through each step in a remediation
workflow and provides some key legal ramifications for how that step
may proceed. Section IV explores more deeply the key provisions in
copyright law favoring the creation and sharing of accessible texts;
this section will be of most interest to university counsel’s offices and
other legal experts. Finally, Section V surveys some legal and policy
considerations beyond copyright and civil rights that may be worth
bearing in mind as institutions design their collaborations in areas
where law gives them flexibility.

1. Disability Rights Obligations for Institutions of
Higher Education
IHEs have legal and moral obligations to provide all students and
researchers with an equal opportunity to participate in and benefit
from their programs, and cannot discriminate on the basis of disability.3
Failure to meet that obligation exposes IHEs to risk of enforcement
actions that can be brought by multiple federal agencies as well as
by affected individuals and associations committed to disability
rights. Accordingly, the law provides a strong incentive, in addition
to IHEs’ own commitment to mission, to adopt programs that ensure
instructional materials are available in accessible formats.4 An efficient,
reliable shared source of accessible texts would be a powerful bulwark
against IHE liability. This section surveys the primary sources of
legal authority supporting disability rights as well as the enforcement
landscape.

The Law and Accessible Texts: Reconciling Civil Rights and Copyrights
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Key Legal Provisions
In the U.S., there are a number of laws that serve as the basis of federal
policy for persons with disabilities. These include the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, and a 1998 amendment to the Rehabilitation Act (Section
508). Combined, these statutes and amendments ensure accessibility
for individuals with disabilities to public accommodations, services,
employment, and more. In addition to federal law, many states have
implemented accessibility statutes and regulations.5
The ADA mandates the elimination of discrimination on the basis
of disability. Titles I, II, and III of the ADA prohibit discrimination
against individuals under certain circumstances. Title I prohibits
discrimination in public and private employment, while Title II
provides individuals with disabilities with an equal opportunity to
benefit from all state and local government programs, services, and
activities. Finally, Title III prohibits discrimination regarding the
“full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, or accommodations” of any public accommodations,
including private, postsecondary institutions. Thus, campuses and,
in particular, research libraries and disability services offices, in
both public and private institutions, must comply with certain ADA
provisions.
In addition, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibits
discrimination on the basis of disability in programs and activities by
those entities that receive federal financial assistance. Pell Grants and
Federal Work Study grants are examples of federal assistance.
Finally, Section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1998
relates to access to federally funded programs and services. The
amendment requires that the electronic and information technologies
that an agency develops, procures, maintains, and/or uses must be
accessible to federal employees and all members of the public. Since
The Law and Accessible Texts: Reconciling Civil Rights and Copyrights
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Section 508 was enacted, many states have enacted similar laws and
requirements.
One important aspect of these laws and regulations is that the
obligations they place on regulated entities evolve and change as new
technologies are developed. Disability rights law does not require
measures that would impose undue burdens on institutions, but as
technology changes the calculus of what constitutes a reasonable
accommodation, institutions need to reevaluate their obligations
toward disabled members of their communities.6 Just as accessibility
law discourages use of inaccessible technology, it also encourages the
adoption of accessible technology.
Enforcement
The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) Civil Rights Division and
the U.S. Department of Education (ED) Office of Civil Rights share
responsibility for oversight and enforcement of legal provisions
relating to individuals with disabilities at colleges and universities.
For example, the DOJ is responsible for enforcement of Title III of the
ADA relating to private universities and colleges, and both departments
jointly enforce legal requirements under Title II of the ADA applicable
to public universities; additionally, ED oversees Section 504 regarding
public and private educational institutions that receive financial aid
from the Department of Education. Finally, in February 2011,7 the
Institute of Museum and Library Services (IMLS) issued guidance on
“Making Museums and Libraries More Accessible,” intended to help
grantees comply with federal regulations barring discrimination by
recipients of federal funds.8
Federal agencies’ commitment to enforcing disability rights laws is
bipartisan and has spanned multiple administrations.9 As a result,
wide-ranging consent decrees have compelled universities to create
comprehensive policies and procedures, and to devote substantial
resources to ensuring that disabled members of the campus community
The Law and Accessible Texts: Reconciling Civil Rights and Copyrights
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have equitable access to technology and other university services,
including course materials.10 IHEs, and in particular research libraries,
have made accessibility a priority in recent years, developing best
practices and working collaboratively with disability rights groups to
ensure compliance not only with the letter but also with the spirit of
the law.11
DSOs are on the frontlines of ensuring compliance with civil rights
laws. Without their considerable efforts to ensure material required
for coursework and independent research is available in accessible
formats, for example, print-disabled students could have credible
claims of discrimination. IHEs can strengthen their support for civil
rights, and reduce risk of liability, by empowering DSOs wherever
possible with new tools, including legal sources of accessible texts
as well as infrastructure for managing remediation of texts and
coordinating fulfillment of qualifying requests.

2. Why Perceived Copyright Limits Have Been a
Barrier to Accessibility
Copyright has been perceived by DSOs and others as a major barrier to
providing accessible texts to persons with disabilities. Most learning
and research materials fall within the scope of copyright protection
under federal law. Interviews and focus group discussions with
members of the DSO community recounted in the LTA report suggest
these professionals feel a general sense of anxiety about perceived
legal risk associated with remediating and sharing texts. This anxiety
leads to self-policing behavior that impedes the mission of their
offices. Permissions are sought needlessly (and sometimes repeatedly
for the same title), remediated texts are needlessly destroyed only
to be recreated when the next semester begins or the next request is
received, a practice the law simply does not require. In addition, dire
legal warnings accompany texts shared with print-disabled students,
and needlessly exhaustive records are kept, all in deference to the
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perceived requirements of copyright law. Perhaps most alarmingly,
students and their institutions routinely purchase additional
inaccessible copies solely as a predicate for receiving accessible ones.
DSOs routinely engage in these behaviors due to anxiety over copyright
law.
The causes of this anxiety are
multifarious, but a few key vectors
[N]one of these conditions is
surfaced in the LTA discussions
required by or even related
and in the course of the expert
to copyright law; they are
included in licenses and terms
meeting that informed this white
of use and enforceable only by
paper. Perhaps the most important
contract law, and only against
is the practice of large publishers
those who accept the terms.
who impose costly and wasteful
contractual restrictions when they
voluntarily provide accessible texts to
DSOs. For example, the Access Text Network (a service created under
the auspices of the Association of American Publishers) requires DSOs
to agree to seek publisher permission for each individual student who
needs access to an ATN-provided accessible file, not to share such files
with other IHEs (even other “qualified” ATN users) without advance
publisher permission, and to destroy or “securely archive” each ATNprovided file after the student who requested the text graduates.12
As we will see below, none of these conditions is required by or even
related to copyright law; they are included in licenses and terms of
use and enforceable only by contract law, and only against those who
accept the terms. Unfortunately, DSOs perceive these requirements
as derived from the publishers’ copyrights rather than as contractual
obligations.
Indeed, some publishers go one step further and include alarming
and misleading warnings in the forms and cover sheets they use
when providing accessible texts to DSOs. For example, one publisher
currently includes this warning on its accessible text order form:
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EXCHANGE OF THIS OR ANY OTHER FILE, IN A MODIFIED
FORMAT OR COPY THEREOF, IS A VIOLATION OF THE U.S.
COPYRIGHT ACT. SEPARATE AUTHORIZATION MUST BE
OBTAINED FOR EVERY USER OF THIS FILE, ITS MODIFIED
FORMAT OR COPY THEREOF, AND SEPARATE PROOF OF
PURCHASE OF THE TEXT MUST BE PROVIDED. [Capitalization
in the original.]
As explained below, this statement is simply false. Both fair use and
Section 121 authorize “exchange” of files in support of accessibility
without any need to seek “authorization,” whether for the first or any
subsequent user, and no proof of purchase is required.13 Nevertheless,
most DSOs trust that such publishers’ statements provide accurate
information about the law, and limit their practices accordingly.
Two more factors likely contribute to copyright anxiety in the DSO
community. One is the relative novelty of some key legal developments
favoring accessibility. The Second Circuit’s landmark opinion in
Authors Guild v. HathiTrust,14 for example, was issued in 2014.
Five years may seem like a long time, but it can take years for large
institutions to change their practices related to copyright law. For
example, as late as the early 2000s many IHEs still were attempting
to conform their course support activities to copyright guidelines for
“classroom photocopying” from the 1970s that bear little resemblance
to the way the law applies to technology in use today.15
A second, related factor may be the relative paucity of litigation (and
consequently of case law) on this particular set of overlapping issues.
No DSO has ever been sued (or threatened with suit, as far as we can
tell) for copyright infringement. With the instructive exception of the
Authors Guild’s failed litigation against HathiTrust and some of its
members, would-be copyright plaintiffs have generally steered clear
of lawsuits against libraries and IHEs for making works accessible
to people with disabilities. Even that case began as an adjunct to a
previous litigation campaign against Google, and the accessibility
The Law and Accessible Texts: Reconciling Civil Rights and Copyrights
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issue arose only because it was raised and vigorously defended by
the defendants. As a result, the HathiTrust opinion is the only circuit
court opinion dealing with the application of fair use to accessibility
issues, and the district court’s opinion is the only judicial application
of Section 121. IHEs and other entities who operate under the Chafee
Amendment and fair use to provide accessible texts have typically
been careful and conscientious, and they are potentially sympathetic
defendants. Copyright holders also recognize that the downside risk of
a lawsuit includes not only losing a particular case but also establishing
clear precedent favoring access more generally, as happened in the
HathiTrust litigation.
While the case law directly on point may be limited, the principles
applied in the two HathiTrust opinions are clear, convincing, and
consistent with other lines of case law. The scope and purpose of
Section 121 are broad and clear. The Marrakesh Treaty and regulations
promulgated by the Copyright Office add to the authority favoring
accessibility. Section IV provides a more detailed discussion of each
of these legal authorities, but first Section III provides practitioners
a quick guide to copyright law’s most important implications for a
networked, cooperative arrangement for providing accessible texts to
qualified users.

3. Each Step of a Remediation and Sharing
Workflow Is Permitted by Copyright
The law is much more permissive than is reflected in common practice
at many DSOs and in voluntary arrangements offered by publishers. It
leaves ample room for IHEs (individually and collectively) and allied
organizations to shape their actions to their own circumstances and
to users’ needs. This section will describe how copyright affects each
major step in a workflow that leverages large collections of digital texts
to provide accessible copies to qualified users.
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The Request
Anyone with a disability that inhibits them from using traditional print
or electronic formats may request an accessible version. Persons with
print disabilities (including learning disabilities as well as visual and
physical impairments) are explicitly covered by both Section 121 and
HathiTrust. The inherent logic of the HathiTrust opinion certainly can
go further, however.
The court in HathiTrust recognized that the text of the legislative
history of Section 107, which refers to blindness, was giving an example
of the scope of fair use with respect to disability, not describing its
outer bounds. The court’s reliance on general disability policy, such
as the Americans with Disabilities Act, and on market failure (which
recurs across other disabilities) supports application of fair use
across all disabilities. While the project that
this white paper seeks to inform will begin
Neither the requestor
with print materials, it need not limit itself
nor the fulfilling
strictly to these materials due to copyright
institution needs
concerns. For example, the Copyright Office
to purchase an
inaccessible copy in
has found that adding closed captioning and
connection with each
audio description to audiovisual materials
(or any) request for
is an important and lawful accommodation
an accessible one.
that authorized entities can make to ensure
equitable access.
Neither the requestor nor the fulfilling institution needs to purchase
an inaccessible copy in connection with each (or any) request for an
accessible one. Section 121 makes no mention of a purchase. Producing
multiple accessible copies from a single source fits perfectly well
within the text of Section 121 and its application by Judge Baer in
HathiTrust. The fair use analysis in HathiTrust is premised on the
importance of accessibility as an objective, and failure of the market to
meet it; again, it makes no mention of additional purchases by either
users or fulfilling institutions.
The Law and Accessible Texts: Reconciling Civil Rights and Copyrights
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Indeed, as the LTA report points out,16 to the extent that the emergence
of a market solution would be desirable, the best incentive for that
emergence is the expectation of new revenue to be derived from
serving the disabled. Requiring the purchase of an inaccessible copy
removes that incentive.
Remediation
As noted above, the preparation of a remediated copy in response to a
request is unproblematic from a copyright standpoint. Likewise, IHEs
and their affiliates are free to anticipate future requests by preparing
accessible texts of works that are likely to be in demand.
A secondary copyright puzzle that might arise at this stage is whether
a new copyright-eligible work is created as a result of the remediation
process. The Copyright Act does provide for new copyrights in
“derivative works” based on existing works, “such as a translation…
sound recording…or any other form in which a work may be recast,
transformed, or adapted.”17 In order to merit a new copyright, however,
a derivative work must itself embody new original expression
contributed by its author(s), a condition highly unlikely to obtain
where texts are remediated with an intent to reproduce the underlying
work as faithfully as possible in an accessible format.18
Mere changes in file format or technical interventions such as adding
markup tags would not reach the requisite threshold of creativity. Even
changes that involve human judgment aren’t necessarily creative in
the way required by copyright.19 Some remediations, however, such as
the creation of written descriptions of images or figures, or the audio
recording of a reading (arguably a performance) of a textual work, may
involve the creation of new expressive content that could, arguably,
result in a new copyright-eligible work.
To avoid needless complexity and ensure the smooth functioning of the
remediation service, IHEs should consider steps to clearly, consistently,
The Law and Accessible Texts: Reconciling Civil Rights and Copyrights
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and systematically renounce any copyright interest associated with
their remediation activities. The CC0 Public Domain Dedication
license20 may be a useful tool for this purpose.
Delivery
Once accessible copies are created, they can be delivered to requestors
in file formats appropriate for their use, without technological
protection measures (TPMs). Of course, it is important to have a system
in place to verify eligibility. But neither Section 121 nor the application
of fair use in the HathiTrust opinion requires use of TPMs, which
can create compatibility problems with reader software. Indeed, the
Library of Congress has repeatedly issued rules that permit breaking
TPMs in order to ensure that accessible materials can be made
available for use by persons with disabilities.21 Some repositories have
used fingerprinting or watermarking to facilitate monitoring whether
accessible copies are further distributed.22 Their findings so far suggest
such sharing is exceedingly rare. IHEs should weigh serious privacy
and efficiency concerns against existing evidence of low incidence of
downstream sharing in considering whether and how to implement
such measures. DSOs should include simple, accurate23 information
about the copyright status of the work shared and the legal rights of the
requester to make further uses of the work. Importantly, DSOs should
create prudent practices to assure that accessible copies are made and
distributed exclusively to qualified people who have disabilities.
Retention and Sharing
A long line of fair use case law supports the creation of databases of
in-copyright works as part of a system that is reasonably necessary to
support a legitimate fair use.24 Since the delivery of accessible texts
to qualified persons is a lawful fair use, the creation of the underlying
database(s) that make that delivery possible is also noninfringing.
Indeed, this is one of the primary lessons of the HathiTrust decision.
Libraries and disability services offices have long relied on partnerships
The Law and Accessible Texts: Reconciling Civil Rights and Copyrights
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with other authorized institutions, such as the National Library Service
Program, the HathiTrust Digital Library, Learning Ally (formerly
Recordings for the Blind and Dyslexic), state and regional Libraries for
the Blind, Bookshare, and the American Printing House for the Blind.
In creating and administering a shared database (or federated
collection of databases), IHEs should take reasonable steps to ensure
the security of the stored materials. The court’s discussion of this issue
in HathiTrust is instructive. There the Authors Guild raised the general
prospect of the database being hacked as evidence of market harm, but
gave no evidence of specific vulnerabilities in HathiTrust’s systems.
HathiTrust gave a clear account of the various steps it takes to ensure
its database is secure against intrusions, and the court found these
steps were reasonable. It compared the Guild’s worries to similar cases
where such concerns were held to be “speculative.”25

4. Copyright Law Provides IHEs and Affiliates Broad
Latitude to Make and Share Accessible Texts
IHEs in the United States have broad latitude to make and share
accessible texts in order to provide equitable access to knowledge
for qualified researchers and learners they serve. Copyright law
includes two key statutory provisions, fair use and Section 121, that
protect this activity domestically.26 The Copyright Office’s triennial
anti-circumvention rulemaking has also consistently recognized
and vindicated accessibility as an important value, and has declared
repeatedly that fair use protects the creation and distribution of
accessible texts.27 The Marrakesh Treaty provides another clear
pathway for cross-border sharing of accessible texts. By means of these
provisions, copyright law ensures that proprietary interests yield to
accessibility when the two come into apparent conflict.
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Copyright’s Purpose
Copyright law in the U.S. exists to serve the public interest.28 The
Constitution empowers Congress to award copyrights to authors “for
limited times” in order to “promote the progress of science….”29 The
copyright system assumes that, generally speaking, granting exclusive
rights will provide an incentive to authors and publishers who might not
otherwise create or publish new works. These incentives are a means
to an end, however, and the law includes limitations and exceptions to
exclusive rights to ensure they do not unduly burden the very public
interest they were designed to serve, especially the First Amendment
values of freedom of expression and access to knowledge.30 We should
recognize, then, that the general fair use right and the specific provisions
described below are as important to the vindication of copyright’s
ultimate purpose as the copyright holder’s exclusive rights themselves.31
The limitations Congress enacted in Sections 107–122 help to define the
ambit of the copyright holder’s Section 106 rights, which themselves exist
explicitly “Subject to” the rights and uses described in Sections 107–122.
Fair Use and the HathiTrust Opinion
The broadest protection for making and sharing accessible texts comes
from fair use, codified at Section 107 of the Copyright Act. Fair use was
originally developed by judges to ensure that the exclusive rights granted
by copyright do not unduly frustrate socially beneficial uses, especially
ones that advance the goals of copyright law. Its origin in the U.S. is often
traced to Judge Joseph Story’s opinion in Folsom v. Marsh,32 the first
opinion to describe what were later codified as the four statutory factors
that courts must consider in deciding whether a use is fair. The doctrine
has even deeper roots in English common law, as courts have recognized
from the earliest days of copyright that strict enforcement of copyright
will sometimes conflict with general principles of justice and sound
policy.33 Congress codified fair use at Section 107 in the Copyright Act
of 1976. The Supreme Court has described fair use as one of the “built in
First Amendment safety valves” in the U.S. copyright system.34
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The text of Section 107 reads:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair
use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in
copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that
section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship,
or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining
whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use
the factors to be considered shall include—
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to
the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of
fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above
factors.
The statutory factors provide a useful framework for judicial
consideration of the facts in each case, but they guide a flexible process
of legal development that continues in the courts. This is clear from
the text itself, which instructs courts to consider a non-exclusive list
of four factors, but leaves them discretion to include additional factors.
Use of the phrase “such as” in the preamble indicates that the statute’s
list of favored purposes (news reporting, scholarship, criticism, etc.)
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is open-ended. We must turn to legislative history and case law, then, to
learn more about how fair use applies today.
Legislative History
The House Report expresses a legislative intent merely to “endorse” the
common law doctrine as it had developed in the courts, and disclaims
any intent to “freeze” it.35 Nevertheless, the House Report describes
several activities Congress believed were likely to be fair under the newly
codified doctrine, and courts have relied on these examples for guidance
in relevant circumstances. One such illustration is “the making of copies
or phonorecords of works in the special forms needed for the use of
blind persons.”36 The report goes on to give as examples of these “special
forms” both Braille and recordings of books being read aloud. It notes
that works in these formats “are not usually made by the publishers for
commercial distribution,” and endorses both the efforts of the Library of
Congress and the work of “individual volunteers” in local libraries who
made accessible copies in response to patron requests. This congressional
intent was endorsed by the Supreme Court in the Sony Betamax case,
and later weighed as part of the first factor inquiry in HathiTrust. It
also factored into the development of best practices for academic and
research libraries.
Code of Best Practices
Fair use best practices statements, developed through a rigorous process
of interviews and small group discussions followed by independent legal
review, have enabled a wide array of communities to better understand
and exercise their fair use rights.37 The Code of Best Practices in Fair
Use for Academic and Research Libraries38 (ARL Code) expresses the
consensus of academic and research librarians on the application of fair
use to a set of situations they frequently encounter. Principle Five of the
ARL Code states that providing accessible material is likely to be fair,
particularly when tailored to the specific needs of the patron.39 The ARL
Code also provides that the fair use case is strongest when efforts are
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coordinated with the university’s DSO, when the library informs users
of their rights and responsibilities, and when it adopts policies that are
widely and consistently applied.
Authors Guild v. HathiTrust
No cases involving copyright and accessibility were decided prior to
or for almost four decades following the passage of the 1976 Copyright
Act. The appellate courts’ first encounter with it was in Authors Guild
v. HathiTrust,40 part of the litigation in response to the Google Books
project.41 No court has ruled on the application of fair use to accessible
texts since the Second Circuit’s 2014 opinion in HathiTrust, which is
destined to be highly influential.42
The case’s import is deepened by the tendency of appellate courts in
other circuits to look to the Second Circuit as a source of expertise on
copyright. The court handles a steady diet of complex copyright cases
thanks to the concentration of media businesses in New York, and
judges on the circuit have shaped the law nationwide. This influence
includes groundbreaking cases and articles on the meaning and
scope of fair use. The court’s application of fair use therefore merits a
detailed recapitulation.
HathiTrust was created by research libraries and operated by the
University of Michigan with the initial task of managing the library of
digitized works that was started with the Google Books project. Since
its creation, HathiTrust has grown its membership to more than 140
institutions, and has continued to grow its collection (the HathiTrust
Digital Library, or HDL) with contributions from other digitization
initiatives.43 The Authors Guild brought suit against HathiTrust and
several of its member libraries in order to block all unauthorized
uses of the HDL. In particular, the Guild alleged that HathiTrust and
the University of Michigan were infringing copyrights by providing
accessible texts to qualified print-disabled patrons. The National
Federation of the Blind (NFB) and several of its members, in an unlikely
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but ingenious strategic move, joined the case as defendants on behalf
of the print-disabled users of the HDL. Judges in both the District
Court and the Second Circuit ruled strongly in favor of HathiTrust, its
member libraries, and the NFB. The district court opinion, by Judge
Baer, dealt with both Section 121 and fair use, whereas the appeals
court focused only on the latter doctrine.
The first important takeaway from
the Second Circuit HathiTrust
Fair use protects the
creation and manipulation
opinion is not specific to accessibility,
of databases of inbut is rather a reaffirmation of an
copyright material as part
important general principle of fair
of a technological process
use in the digital age: fair use protects
that is reasonably necessary
the creation and manipulation of
to produce fair use results.
databases of in-copyright material as
part of a technological process that is
reasonably necessary to produce fair use results.44 The creation of such
a full-text database “behind the curtain” (i.e., inaccessible to the public)
is not evaluated separately from its ultimate public-facing use; instead,
the fair use evaluation of the resulting use provides the predicate
for evaluating the invisible, technological processes (including the
building of the database itself ) that are reasonably necessary to make
those results possible. This is an important insight, given that the third
statutory factor asks courts to consider the “amount and substantiality
of the portion used.” In some cases, the use of an entire work could
weigh heavily against fair use, but in cases involving databases like
this, use of entire works is consistent with fair use because that is the
amount that must be collected and processed in support of publicfacing uses that are deemed fair uses.
Next, the court turns to the first factor: the nature and purpose of the
use. This factor has come to play a pivotal role in the fair use analysis
in recent decades, as its outcome tends to color the evaluation of the
remaining factors. Here the court weighs several considerations before
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concluding that providing accessible texts to the print-disabled is a
valid fair use purpose under the first factor.
First, the Second Circuit finds that providing accessible copies for users
to read is not “transformative,” a term of art in fair use jurisprudence
that denotes use for a new or different purpose. Examples of
transformative use include parody, news reporting, and the operation
of a search engine. Such uses are strongly favored, but the court is quick
to point out that a finding of transformative use is not necessary to
tilt the first factor, much less the final fair use analysis, in favor of the
user.45
Second, the court looks to Supreme Court jurisprudence and legislative
history. These two reinforce one another. The Supreme Court has
acknowledged that, “Making a copy of a copyrighted work for the
convenience of a blind person” is an example of fair use, citing
legislative history. The Second Circuit cites both the Supreme Court
and the underlying House Report language described above, weighing
both as evidence that accessibility is a favored fair use purpose.46 The
court also quotes with approval the House Report’s allusion to the lack
of a functioning market to provide accessible format copies to the print
disabled, an issue that resurfaces in consideration of the fourth factor.
Finally, the court rounds out its consideration of the first factor by
highlighting the importance of accessibIlity as a social “purpose.” It
notes that since the passage of the 1976 Copyright Act, Congress has
“reaffirmed its commitment to ameliorating the hardships faced by
the blind and the print-disabled.”47 As evidence, the court cites the
Americans with Disabilities Act and the Chafee Amendment. Taken
together, these considerations tilt the first factor decisively in favor of
HathiTrust. To these expressions of federal policy favoring accessibility
we can now add the Marrakesh Treaty and implementing legislation, as
well as the Copyright Office’s DMCA rulemakings,48 further reinforcing
the logic of the opinion.
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The court gives the second factor (the nature of the work used) the
swift, dismissive treatment that has become standard in fair use cases.
Because HathiTrust includes all kinds of works (fiction and nonfiction,
scholarly and popular, etc.), that factor technically disfavors fair use,
but the court is quick to note that it is “rarely determinative.”49 Indeed,
scholars have found the second factor is never determinative, and
rarely influential at all.50
The third factor (the “amount and substantiality” of the use) is assessed
entirely in light of the first: the court asks whether the nature and
quantity of copying is appropriate to the purpose of providing access
to the print-disabled, which it has already found to be a valid one.
Here, the only dispute appears to be over which files and how many
copies of a given work HathiTrust can retain as part of its efforts to
serve the print-disabled. In finding the HathiTrust Digital Library can
retain page images as well as extracted text, the court reasons that
doing so is reasonable because “gaining access to the HDL’s image
files—in addition to the text-only
files—is necessary [for some printThe court’s conclusion
disabled users] to perceive the books
is clear, broad, and
fully.”51 Keeping four copies in disparate
unconditional: ‘we conclude
locations is justified by the need to
that the doctrine of fair
“balance server load” and to “guard
use allows [HathiTrust] to
provide full digital access to against risk of data loss,”52 reasonable
copyrighted works to their
technological steps in achieving
print-disabled patrons.’
HathiTrust’s valid overarching
purposes.
Finally, the court turns to the fourth factor, the effect of the use on the
market for the works used. Here the court notes that the commercial
market in books for the print-disabled is extremely limited, “a mere few
hundred thousand titles, a minute percentage of the world’s books,”
especially when compared to the “more than 10 million volumes” in the
HathiTrust Digital Library. The court also cites the common practice
of authors foregoing royalties on accessible formats, then returns to the
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1976 House Report, which invoked market failure in its own finding
that fair use should protect the provision of accessible copies to the
print-disabled.
The court’s conclusion is clear, broad, and unconditional: “we conclude
that the doctrine of fair use allows [HathiTrust] to provide full digital
access to copyrighted works to their print-disabled patrons.” The
breadth of this conclusion, together with the clarity of the foregoing
analysis, establishes fair use as a powerful source of authority for IHEs
to create and use digital collections like the HDL to serve disabled
communities with accessible texts.
Section 121
The Second Circuit concludes its fair use analysis in HathiTrust with
a footnote explaining that the scope of its fair use holding makes it
unnecessary to consider the applicability of Section 121. Nevertheless,
Section 121 of the Copyright Act, often referred to as the Chafee
Amendment because it was first introduced by Rhode Island Senator
John Chafee, merits coverage here because it further demonstrates
congressional intent to limit copyright’s exclusive rights to facilitate
broad access to information for the disabled. Specifically, it provides
clear protection for making and sharing accessible texts. Indeed, in the
HathiTrust case itself, the district judge had found Section 121 as well
as fair use applied to the defendants’ conduct. Also, some of the DMCA
exemptions described below still track Section 121 rather than Section
107. The provision was first adopted in 1996, and was recently updated
as part of the U.S.’s implementation of the Marrakesh Treaty, resulting
in additional clarity and a broader scope, in regards to both works
covered and eligible persons.53
Interpreting the Text
Section 121(a) is the key provision for IHEs, and it provides that,
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“Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an
infringement of copyright for an authorized entity to reproduce or to
distribute in the United States copies or phonorecords of a
previously published literary work or of a previously published
musical work that has been fixed in the form of text or notation if
such copies or phonorecords are reproduced or distributed in
accessible formats exclusively for use by eligible persons.” [italics
added]
The italicized terms have statutory definitions worth unpacking.
IHEs may wonder whether they are considered “authorized entities”
for purposes of the statute. The answer is certainly “yes.” The term’s
statutory definition is: “a nonprofit organization or a governmental
agency that has a primary mission to provide specialized services
relating to training, education, or adaptive reading or information
access needs of blind or other persons with disabilities[.]”54 IHEs meet
this definition, as they do have provision of such services as “a primary
mission.” For further guidance, we can turn to the district court’s
opinion in HathiTrust, which addressed both fair use and Section 121.
That opinion held: “The ADA requires that libraries of educational
institutions have a primary mission to reproduce and distribute
their collections to print-disabled individuals, making each library a
potential ‘authorized entity’ under the Chafee Amendment.”55
The next defined term is “accessible formats.” Added to Section 121
by the Marrakesh Treaty Implementation Act, it is defined in a way
that reflects the reality of digital accessible texts. The original Section
121 used the term “specialized formats,” which was limited to “braille,
audio, or digital text.” The Authors Guild and some of its amici relied
on the word “specialized” to argue that versatile digital text formats
potentially useful to those without disabilities should be excluded
from Section 121, an argument both courts rejected. The Marrakesh
Treaty Implementation Act now broadly frames the types of accessible
formats as “an alternative manner that gives an eligible person access
to the work . . . to permit him or her to have access as feasibly and
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comfortably as a person without such disability.” The Senate Report
language clarifies that the provision includes “related illustrations”
such as graphs, maps, tables, or other forms of presentation.
Furthermore, “It is understood that authorized entities may introduce
such changes in a copyrighted work as are necessary to make the
work accessible in the alternative format, taking into account the
accessibility needs of the persons concerned. Such changes include, but
are not limited to, differences in format or presentation.”56
The next term that needs definition is “eligible persons.” The
Marrakesh Treaty Implementation Act amended Section 121 to remove
certification requirements. Now, the statute describes three categories
of persons who meet this definition—anyone who:
(A) is blind;
(B) has a visual impairment or perceptual or reading disability that
cannot be improved to give visual function substantially equivalent
to that of a person who has no such impairment or disability and so
is unable to read printed works to substantially the same degree as a
person without an impairment or disability; or
(C) is otherwise unable, through physical disability, to hold or
manipulate a book or to focus or move the eyes to the extent that
would be normally acceptable for reading[.]
When compared to the previous version of the statute, this language
helps clarify that the provision is meant to apply not only to physical
disabilities specifically affecting vision, but also to any disability
(including learning disabilities and mobility impairments) that affect
the ability to read text in a standard format.
Other key aspects of the law are the works to which it applies and the
additional requirements it creates for copies and phonorecords created
under its authority. Section 121 applies to all “previously published
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literary work[s] or…previously published musical work[s] that ha[ve]
been fixed in the form of text or notation.”57 This language expands the
original Section 121 to add dramatic literary works (i.e., written plays
and screenplays) and written musical works to the scope of the law,
which previously only covered “non-dramatic literary works.” The
statute (redundantly) bars the creation of copies that are not intended
for eligible persons.58 It also requires two notices be included with
accessible copies: a copyright notice identifying the copyright owner
and date of publication (this notice can typically be found on the
original work and simply reproduced),59 and a “notice that any further
reproduction or distribution in a format other than an accessible
format is an infringement.”60
Given the folk practice around this among DSOs, one aspect of Section
121 bears specific mention (indeed, repetition): there neither was nor
is any requirement that either the authorized entity or the eligible
person purchase an inaccessible copy before providing or receiving an
accessible one. The law also says nothing about either the provider or
the recipient having a responsibility to destroy accessible copies at any
time after the transfer. This arrangement—permitting copying without
purchase, and with the assumption that the copy will be retained by
the recipient—is not unique to Section 121; the Copyright Act similarly
provides in Section 108 that libraries and archives may provide
patrons with copies of portions or, where they are not commercially
available, copies of entire works, with one condition being that the copy
“becomes the property of” the requestor.61
Relation to Fair Use
While Section 121 describes a relatively generous scope of protected
activity for IHEs serving researchers with disabilities, the fair use right
remains vital. This is so in part because of its potential applicability to
an open-ended class of works, including those excluded from Section
121. The most important of these is audio-visual works, including
motion pictures, which can be made accessible to learners with
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hearing disabilities by adding closed captions, or to those with visual
disabilities by adding audio description. Remediation, distribution,
and retention of such works would have to rely on fair use. Other
works excluded from Section 121 and 121A include unpublished
works; pantomimes and choreographic works; pictorial, graphical, and
sculptural works; and architectural works.
Specific copyright limitations do not limit the general availability of
fair use in related (or even identical) situations. Courts affirmed this
principle repeatedly in the HathiTrust case. In the district court, Judge
Baer said the Authors Guild’s argument “that the Chafee Amendment
defines the outer bounds of protected copying on behalf of printdisabled individuals is without merit,” saying there was nothing in
Section 121 showing an intent to preempt fair use.62 On appeal, the
Authors Guild tried again, arguing that fair use should be preempted
by Section 108, which permits libraries
and archives to engage in certain kinds of
Specific copyright
reproduction and distribution. That strategy
limitations do not
failed, as the court dismissed the argument
limit the general
in a footnote, citing the savings clause at
availability of fair use
Section 108(f )(4).63 As noted above, the
in related (or even
Second Circuit held that fair use applied
identical) situations.
so decisively to HathiTrust’s accessibility
program that it did not need to reach Section
121.64 Congress later made its intent to leave fair use in place explicit in
Section 121A(e): “Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the
ability to engage in any activity otherwise permitted under this title.”
The Marrakesh Treaty, Section 121A, and the United States’
Continuing Commitment to Accessibility
The Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works
for Persons Who Are Blind, Visually Impaired or Otherwise
Print Disabled65 was adopted by the World Intellectual Property
Organization’s (WIPO) member states (including the United States) in
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2013. The treaty is a response to what is often characterized as a “global
book famine,” in which 285 million people in the world live with
print disabilities but only 1–7% of books are published in accessible
formats.66 According to WIPO, “The Treaty has a single objective: to
increase access to books, magazines and other printed materials for
people with print disabilities. It aims to achieve this by making it easier
for accessible copies to be created and shared across international
borders.”67 It requires all signatories to create exceptions to copyright
that clearly permit the creation and cross-border sharing of accessible
texts for the benefit of the print disabled.
Section 121A and Cross-Border Sharing
To ensure compliance with the Marrakesh Treaty, Congress added a
new Section 121A to Title 17 of the U.S. Code. Under that section, it
is lawful to export accessible texts to authorized entities or eligible
persons in other Marrakesh Treaty signatory countries. It is also lawful
to import copies (or phonorecords, in the case of sound recordings) of a
previously published literary work or of a previously published musical
work that has been fixed in the form of text or notation in accessible
formats. This sharing is permitted subject to the requirement to
establish and follow practices to achieve a laundry list of objectives:
• Ensure the person being served is eligible
• Limit distribution of copies only to eligible persons or authorized
entities
• Discourage reproduction and distribution of unauthorized copies
• “Maintain due care in, and records of, the handling of copies of
works by the authorized entity, while respecting the privacy of
eligible persons on an equal basis with others”
• Make publicly available titles of works that are available in
accessible formats
• Make publicly available information about the policies, practices,
and partners of the authorized entity partners for cross-border
exchange
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So, while Section 121A provides a clear right to share accessible texts
across borders, it requires institutions to do some work developing
policy. Moreover, it applies to the sharing of only certain kinds of works
with specific countries.
Fortunately, thanks to the savings clause at Section 121A(e), institutions
can also rely on fair use for cross-border sharing of accessible texts in
cases where Section 121A might not apply (principally, in dealing with
countries who are not signatories to the Marrakesh Treaty). Section
602(a) bars exportation without permission where the copy at issue
is infringing. Section 107, however, provides that fair use “is not an
infringement of copyright.” Because the provision of accessible texts
to qualified persons constitutes a fair use, exportation does not violate
Section 602. Likewise, U.S. institutions and individuals can rely on
fair use to justify the importation of accessible materials from foreign
countries, without regard for the restrictions (to published literary and
musical works only) incorporated in Section 121A.
The Treaty as Evidence of Ongoing Legislative Commitment to
Accessibility
The process of negotiating, adopting, ratifying, and implementing the
Marrakesh Treaty establishes a broad, deep, ongoing commitment
to accessibility by both the executive and legislative branches of the
government, and it shows their recognition that copyright limitations
are essential to ensuring access for the disabled. Indeed, the Senate
Report accompanying the Marrakesh Treaty Implementation Act
concludes that ratification “will help give people with print disabilities,
here and all over the world, greater access to books and other texts
in accessible formats.”68 In the negotiation process, the United
States Trade Representative led a diverse delegation of executive
branch agency representatives and consulted with representatives
from disability rights organizations, creative industries, library and
education groups, and public interest organizations.
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After WIPO’s adoption of the treaty, the Senate took up ratification,
including consideration of implementing legislation, i.e., changes to
U.S. law to ensure compliance with the treaty. While many experts
argued that U.S. law was already consistent with the treaty, the Senate
ultimately decided, in consultation with federal agencies and others,
that implementing legislation was needed. The Marrakesh Treaty
Implementation Act (MTIA) was signed into law in October 2018, an
occasion then-Acting Register of Copyrights Karyn A. Temple called
“an exciting day for copyright law.”69 Finally, in January 2019, the
Trump administration deposited its ratification documents with WIPO,
bringing the U.S. officially into the community of Marrakesh Treaty
ratifiers.
The treaty affects accessibility law in three main ways. First, as the
discussion above describes, the MTIA expanded and clarified Section
121’s protection for domestic provision of accessible texts. Second,
the strong, repeated affirmation of U.S. government policy favoring
accessibility should add weight to the first factor fair use argument
made in HathiTrust. This multi-year process leaves no room for doubt
that public policy favors accessibility. The evidence marshalled in favor
of the treaty also supports the fourth factor argument that the market
continues to fail decisively in providing accessible copies for the print
disabled. The legislative history of the MTIA shows congressional
intent that amendments to Section 121 were done only “to conform
certain terms and provisions of section 121 to the language of the
Marrakesh Treaty for purposes of clarity and consistency,”70 rather
than to alter its relationship with other provisions of the Copyright
Act (including fair use). Section 121A provides that “Nothing in
this section shall be construed to limit the ability to engage in any
activity otherwise permitted under this title,” such as fair use. And
third, of course, the legislation creates new, explicit exportation and
importation rights, described in more detail above.
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The Copyright Office and Librarian of Congress’s History of
Favoring Accessibility in the 1201 Rulemaking
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act created a new cause of action,
separate from copyright infringement, that a copyright holder could
bring against anyone who circumvents a technological protection
measure that effectively controls access to an in-copyright work.71
In other words, it created a new bar against the hacking of digital
locks. This bar is not expressly subject to any of the limitations and
exceptions in the Copyright Act, including fair use.72 In recognition of
the likely burden the provision could place on lawful uses, Congress
also requires the Copyright Office to conduct a rulemaking process
every three years during which it hears evidence of Section 1201’s
effect on lawful uses and recommends rules exempting certain uses
from the law’s bar on circumvention. The Librarian of Congress has
the ultimate authority to issue exemptions based on the Register’s
recommendations. Advocates for exceptions bear the burden of
convincing the Register and the Librarian that their uses are lawful and
that they are unduly burdened by the anti-circumvention provision.
Since 2003, every set of exemptions has included a rule permitting
circumvention of TPMs protecting ebooks that prevent use of
accessibility functions by print-disabled readers.73 This means that the
Register of Copyrights, in consultation with attorneys at the Copyright
Office and at the National Telecommunications and Information
Administration, has found repeatedly that such uses are likely to be
lawful and non-infringing. The shape of these exemptions has evolved
over time thanks to the efforts of disability rights organizations,
education groups, and law clinics.
Starting in 2012, the rules were expanded to cover circumvention
by “authorized entities” as defined in Section 121.74 The rules were
renewed in each subsequent cycle, and the policy of the Americans
with Disabilities Act has been cited in support of the lawfulness of
these uses. In 2018, a new rule was adopted to permit captioning
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and audio description of video material for instructional uses, again
with a predicate finding that “making motion pictures accessible to
students with disabilities by adding captions and/or audio description
is likely noninfringing.”75 That finding is based on fair use, not Section
121, which does not apply to audiovisual works. It is also noteworthy
that the 2018 rule specifically references the legal obligations that
disability rights laws place on educational institutions, recognizing that
copyright must yield to these obligations.76
Future rulemakings will be affected by the Marrakesh Treaty,
which requires signatories to provide for the ability to circumvent
technological protections in support of accessibility. The Copyright
Office and the Librarian of Congress will have to renew the current
exemption (in some form) in order to remain compliant with the treaty.
Indeed, the current exemption is narrower than what is permitted by
Section 121 as it was updated by the Marrakesh Treaty Implementation
Act.
This long pattern of rulemaking activity provides more evidence of a
general government policy favoring accessibility, and it adds an expert
agency’s repeated endorsement to the judicial recognition of fair use’s
applicability in HathiTrust. More broadly, it shows the U.S. Copyright
Office recognizes, in its own rulemakings, the scope and validity of
exemptions to copyright rules favoring accessibility.

5. Risk Management in Areas of Discretion
In several areas, copyright law does not prescribe exactly how
accessible texts should be created, handled, or shared. In these areas
where we have discretion to act as far as copyright is concerned, there
are other factors to consider as IHEs endeavor to make wise policy. It is
beyond the scope of this paper to explore these factors in detail. Some
of them, like risk aversion, may lead to doing less than the law actually
allows, or imposing restrictions on the process that the law doesn’t
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actually require. Others may incline decision-makers in the other
direction. Some key considerations are sketched below.
Mission Risk
Mission risk77 is the risk that IHEs will fail to achieve their core
objectives. Ultimately, every IHE has a mission to provide all students,
including those with disabilities, with opportunities for a rich and
deep learning experience, and to provide all researchers with access to
a rich and varied collection of information resources to support their
work. As IHEs consider measures to reduce other kinds of risks, it will
be important to weigh those risks (and the anticipated effectiveness of
risk-reduction measures) against the impairments, if any, that they may
cause to IHEs’ core missions. The use of some technological protection
measures, for example, may reduce the likelihood of illicit downstream
uses (for which institutions are unlikely to be liable in any event78), but
that reduction should be weighed against the countervailing mission
risk associated with adding technical complexity to the accessibility
workflow, which could reduce IHEs’ capacity to serve its core
constituents.
Privacy
At several points in the workflow of providing accessible texts to
qualified users, there are opportunities for the collection, retention,
and even disclosure of information about users. The information most
likely to be generated in this context—users’ identities, the nature of
their disabilities, and the materials they are consulting—can be quite
sensitive. Creation, retention, and sharing of this information may
be regulated by state and federal laws that protect privacy, such as
the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA).79 Ethical
and professional norms also provide guidance as to what kinds of
information about students and other library users should be gathered
or shared and in what circumstances.80 These two can be related: the
American Library Association points to patron privacy laws passed
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in 48 states and the District of Columbia, thanks in part to librarian
advocacy.81 Freedom from undue government surveillance is a closely
related concern, and one that recurs wherever substantial amounts of
information are collected, including in libraries.82 The risk to users’
privacy may be impossible to completely eliminate given the legitimate
need for information about users at certain stages of the workflow,83
but institutions and consortia should consider building in “privacy by
design”84 in the systems they build, including setting rigorous retention
schedules that preclude holding information for longer than it is
needed for the fulfillment of the request.
Autonomy
Fulfillment of the full spirit of the disability rights laws would require
not only that users with disabilities have access to the same materials
as their peers, but also that they have access with the same ease
and autonomy afforded to others. Systems that require mediation
necessarily impose delays and other barriers to access, resulting in
a research or learning experience that is less robust in important
ways than the experience available to folks without disabilities.
For example, many researchers
say they value “serendipity” in
Fulfillment of the full spirit of
their research—the discovery of
the disability rights laws would
unexpected materials through
require not only that users
informal, unstructured browsing
with disabilities have access
helps them make new connections
to the same materials as their
and take unanticipated directions
peers, but also that they have
in their work.85 When access to
access with the same ease and
autonomy afforded to others.
materials is highly mediated (works
can only be consulted one-by-one,
by special request, perhaps with a
delay), it is more difficult to experience serendipity. Another example
is procrastination, a word with pejorative connotations but a practice
that is nevertheless widespread among those without disabilities.
Students and researchers can engage in more extracurricular activities
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or take on more research responsibility if they can expect to have
relatively easy access to browse and interrogate collections materials
in an unmediated way right up to the last second before a particular
assignment is due.86 A heavily mediated research experience takes
procrastination off the table for users with disabilities, reducing their
opportunities for both recreation and additional curricular work (and
possibly reducing their creativity). As IHEs build and improve their
systems for making accessible texts available to qualified users, they
should factor in the legitimate autonomy interests served by reducing
mediation and other sources of friction.
Politics
Any effort to make information more widely available can stir political
opposition. In cross-border sharing, for example, anecdotal evidence
suggests that political opposition to the content of shared materials
is much more likely to impede access than opposition from copyright
holders. This opposition may be expressed through local laws or
regulations banning certain books or the works of certain groups or
in certain genres, or through the exercise
of power by local officials interested
in suppressing particular material.
Fear of political
backlash should be
Institutions considering exportation of
calibrated to reflect
accessible materials may have to weigh
its low likelihood, its
their commitment to free access to
inefficacy were it to
information against the risk of violating
come to pass, and
content regulations or angering political
the countervailing
elites in the importing country, which
risk of ceding hardcould have serious consequences for local
won fair use territory.
allies or for their own campuses there.
Another, more doubtful, category of perceived political risk arises from
IHEs’ perceptions of the trade associations and lobbying groups in
the U.S. that have shown hostility toward the exercise of users’ rights
in the copyright law, and that have sometimes reacted to the exercise
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of those rights by seeking new laws or regulations to constrain it.
Some institutions may accordingly consider whether angering these
groups is a risk worth avoiding. This risk should not be overstated,
however. The Marrakesh Treaty negotiations featured deep, sustained
engagement from groups representing authors, publishers, and even
motion picture studios; given the strong requirement of consensus in
U.S. copyright policy making,87 we can be sure that the resulting treaty
and implementing legislation (including savings clauses recognizing
fair use) secured at least their acquiescence, if not their full-throated
endorsement. The consensus requirement also makes it unlikely that
rightsholder groups, even if they were to pursue a political response
to accessibility efforts, could succeed in the face of opposition from
groups representing libraries, higher education, and disability rights
organizations. Institutions who are confident of their legal rights risk
grave damage to themselves and their constituents if they demur in
exercising those rights. Courts look to actual practice as one indicator
of the scope of rights like fair use, so overly modest practice can
actually impair the scope of the rights themselves.88 Fear of political
backlash should be calibrated to reflect its low likelihood, its inefficacy
were it to come to pass, and the countervailing risk of ceding hard-won
fair use territory.

6. Conclusion
In 2016, Stevie Wonder addressed the United Nations, urging
member states to ratify the Marrakesh Treaty. He told the assembly,
“This is a truly life changing opportunity. It opens the door to the
world’s knowledge to the visually impaired people.”89 Indeed, the
U.S. ratification of the Marrakesh Treaty is the culmination of a
series of developments in U.S. law favoring access to knowledge
regardless of ability, from the Rehabilitation Act to the codification of
the fair use doctrine in the 1976 Copyright Act, to the passage of the
Chafee Amendment and the courts’ decisions in the HathiTrust case.
Collectively, these measures create a framework that IHEs and their
allies and affiliated entities can leverage to increase access and vastly
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improve education and research for all. They ensure that institutions
with an obligation and a mission to pursue justice also have the right to
do so.
Perhaps the most striking takeaway from this survey has been the
extent to which copyright defers to accessibility, not the other way
around. What has emerged is a hierarchy of legal interests, arrayed
under the general heading of the First Amendment and its protection
for expression and access to information. Contrary to what some
have assumed in the past, the first priority under that heading is
accessibility, which consistently trumps the exclusive rights granted
by copyright when the two come into conflict. This priority is built
into the copyright law itself, through both its general fair use right
and its specific provisions favoring accessibility. The effort involved in
ending the book famine for thousands of students and researchers will
be substantial, and there will surely be challenges along the way, but
copyright law should not be one of them
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